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A B S T R A C T
The Central and East European (CEE) countries that had
applied for membership in the European Union were
confronted with far-reaching requirements in order to bring
domestic policies in line with EU standards. Notwithstand-
ing these rather uniform pressures emerging from condi-
tionality, there is considerable variety in alignment
performance across the candidate countries and over time.
To account for this, we use time series cross-sectional data
on the implementation performance of 13 EU candidate
countries between 1999 and 2003. Our results indicate that
the bureaucratic strength and effectiveness of a country
positively influence its ability to adjust domestic arrange-
ments to EU requirements. By contrast, we find no support
for veto-player theories of political constraints on legislative
change. We hence conclude that the implementation of the
acquis communautaire in candidate countries prior to acces-
sion has been a question of bureaucratic problems rather
than of political veto-manoeuvres.
5 3 1
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116506069442
Volume 7 (4): 531–552
Copyright© 2006
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
K E Y  W O R D S
 Europeanization
 implementation
 policy change
 transformation countries
Introduction
Fundamental change has happened in large parts of Europe during the last
10 years. Those countries that had applied for membership of the European
Union (EU) during the 1990s have undergone transformation of unprece-
dented scope and speed in order to bring their economic and political struc-
tures in line with EU standards. This implied far-reaching reforms of
legislation, administration and macroeconomic policies. Most scholars agree
that this process has been driven by the conditionality of EU membership
and its prospective gains for the candidate countries (see Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier, 2004). However, the candidate countries1 have not carried
out reforms at a steady pace and with equal success. Both between countries
and across time, variation has occurred in the implementation of the acquis
communautaire.
How can this variation in implementation performance be explained?
When looking at the growing body of literature on the implementation of EU
policies, it is difficult to come up with a clear answer to this question. This
results from two factors. First, we are confronted with competing theoretical
approaches in order to account for implementation effectiveness in the
member states. Although a number of studies emphasize the influence of
characteristics of the domestic administrative and legal system as well as their
compatibility with European requirements (see Duina, 1997; Knill and
Lenschow, 1998; Bailey, 2002), others point to the importance of institutional
and political constraints affecting the domestic capacity of corresponding
policy adjustments (see Haverland, 2000; Mbaye, 2001; Mastenbroek, 2003;
Versluis, 2004).
Second, this persistence of theoretical ambiguity partially results from the
lack of comprehensive empirical data. So far, there are only a limited number
of case studies that have investigated the formal and practical implementa-
tion of EU law with regard to certain policies and countries. More compre-
hensive quantitative studies, by contrast, primarily concentrate on the aspect
of formal transposition of EU law or infringement proceedings, where the
relevant data are easily available from Commission sources (albeit question-
able in terms of quality; see Börzel, 2001). Comprehensive theory-building is
thus primarily based on the analysis of formal implementation, although it
is highly debatable that this aspect constitutes a viable proxy for the effec-
tiveness of practical application.
In this paper, we try to address these problems. We derive hypotheses
from the differing theoretical arguments in order to test them empirically for
the implementation performance of EU candidate countries. In this context,
we investigate not only aspects of formal transposition but also the extent to
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which EU requirements are applied in practice in the countries under investi-
gation. Our study therefore addresses an important gap in existing imple-
mentation research.
We proceed in the following way. First, we discuss relevant theories that
explain the preconditions for domestic policy change and hence effective
implementation of EU requirements. Second, we use time series cross-
sectional data on the implementation performance of 13 EU candidate
countries between 1999 and 2003 to test several hypotheses derived from the
theoretical discussion. Applying linear regression technique, we find empiri-
cal support for the claim that a candidate country’s administrative strength
positively influences its ability to adjust domestic arrangements to EU
requirements. By contrast, our findings provide no support for veto-player
theories of political constraints on legislative change. This leads us to the
conclusion that the implementation of the acquis communautaire in candidate
countries prior to accession has been a question of bureaucratic problems
rather than political veto-playing.
Theory: Capacities of pre-accession alignment
The central question addressed in this article is why we find differences with
regard to the performance of EU candidate countries in implementing the
acquis communautaire prior to accession (pre-accession alignment). We are inter-
ested in the extent to which the candidate countries were able to bring their
policies – in both formal and practical terms – in line with the EU requirements.
Given this conception of our dependent variable, the implementation perform-
ance of the countries under study is affected by two central aspects that define
the capacity of a country to enact political change, namely (1) its decision-
making capacity and (2) its capability to implement these decisions in practice.
This particular scope of our study has several consequences with regard
to the development of our theoretical approach. These aspects will be
discussed in the following section before our theoretical considerations are
presented in more detail.
Pre-accession alignment and implementation theory
Although the analysis of pre-accession policy alignment in the EU candidate
countries is closely related to questions of the implementation of EU law, we
still need to clarify whether and to what extent existing theories on the imple-
mentation of EU legislation are actually suitable for the purpose of the under-
lying study.
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First, we have to consider the fact that the situation of the candidate
countries in the pre-accession stage crucially differed from that of existing
member states. The candidate countries did not take part in any decision-
making processes on primary or secondary EU legislation and other EU
instruments and they were also not legally obliged to implement EU law. This
is why we will not include hypotheses derived from theories of strategic non-
compliance (e.g. Fearon, 1998) in our analysis.
Second, this constellation does not, however, imply that theories of policy
change and policy implementation cannot be applied to account for perform-
ance variation in pre-accession alignment. There are two reasons for this. On
the one hand, notwithstanding the absence of obligations emerging from
Community law, legal requirements for policy adjustment in the candidate
countries exist. Several free trade agreements that have been expanded into
so-called Europe Agreements provide the institutional framework for bilat-
eral relations between the candidate countries on the one side and the EU
and its member states on the other.
On the other hand, Accession Partnerships were established at the start
of accession negotiations between the EU and the candidate countries. In
these documents, the candidate countries made precise commitments regard-
ing the change in their policies in a large range of areas. Most importantly,
the candidates committed themselves to implementing the acquis communau-
taire. From 1998 onwards, the Commission established a monitoring system
of regular yearly reports to supervise and assess progress towards accession
by each of the candidate countries. All these measures, labelled a ‘pre-
accession strategy’ by the European Commission, are aimed at one decisive
goal: the candidates’ complete achievement of the Copenhagen Criteria,
which were set out as preconditions to membership by the European Council
in 1993, when the presidency concluded:
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of insti-
tutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations
of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union. (European Council, 1993)
What they had to achieve – and are partly still undertaking – can be called
‘policy alignment’, which implies that the countries are able to decide on and
implement far-reaching policy changes. In contrast to member states’ steady
implementation of EU policies, the candidate countries face a much greater
degree of policy change within a much shorter period, which implies the
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adjustment of existing policies not in line with EU legal requirements as well
as the development of new policies in line with the acquis.
Third, based on this conditionality of accession combined with the appli-
cant states’ strong economic and political interests in joining the EU, we
assume that the governments of these countries are generally willing to effec-
tively align their policies. In other words, ineffective or delayed implementa-
tion should not be the result of a general lack of political commitment in the
applicant states. Of course, this does not imply that the intensity of this
commitment might not vary across countries and over time, hence causing
variance in alignment performance. We will take this aspect into consider-
ation by including the party political positions on the EU in our analysis.
Fourth, on the basis of our data, we are able to investigate the degree of
both formal and practical compliance with EU requirements. As mentioned
in the introduction, this contrasts with many quantitative analyses on the
implementation of EU policies that are primarily based on data on formal
transposition and infringements (for a concise overview of the state of the art,
see Mastenbroek, 2005). Our analysis thus contributes to overcoming existing
research gaps with regard to a comprehensive assessment of practical com-
pliance with EU law.
At the same time, however, the nature and focus of our data do not allow
for a differentiated assessment of alignment performance with regard to
single measures or directives. As a consequence, we will not consider theories
that emphasize the legal design of European measures (e.g. the degree of legal
specification or the timing of implementation deadlines) and the decision-
making procedure as explanatory factors in order to account for variation in
implementation effectiveness (see Mastenbroek, 2003; Versluis, 2004).
Moreover, this more general rather than issue- or policy-specific focus of the
study does not allow for testing theories on the differential impact of condi-
tionality, according to which the strength of conditionality as well as the
clarity of the requirements should have a positive influence on implementa-
tion effectiveness (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).
As a result of these considerations, we concentrate in the following on
theories that address both political and bureaucratic capacities and constraints
in order to account for variation in the candidate countries’ performance in
pre-accession alignment. The following sections will show that the theories
applied in this context differ with regard to their explanatory focus; i.e. the
extent to which they can account for the decision-making or implementation
capacity of the political systems in question. As a first step, however, we will
briefly clarify why the theories that were developed to explain the implemen-
tation of EU policies in the member states are also relevant with regard to the
pre-accession alignment of candidate states.
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Political capacities and constraints
There is a broad consensus in the literature that the institutional character-
istics of domestic political systems have an important impact on their reform
capacity and performance. This implies that differences in political insti-
tutions will have consequences for the ability of countries to cope effectively
with EU requirements. However, although most authors agree that domestic
institutions matter, contradictory expectations about the effects of different
arrangements on implementation effectiveness can be found. An important
debate in this respect refers to the extent to which institutional constraints on
political decision-makers restrict or increase a country’s capacity for effec-
tively changing its policies.
Emphasizing the positive impact of institutional constraints on the policy
performance of political systems, Lijphart (1984, 1994, and 1999) has investi-
gated the respective effects of different institutional settings in democratic
systems. Lijphart distinguishes consensus democracies from majoritarian
democracies, arguing that democracies encompassing elements that increase
the necessity for consensual decisions generally perform better than those
whose decisions are based upon majoritarian rule. There are several reasons
for this.
First, proportional representation is to be preferred to plurality. Consen-
sual political institutions, consisting of multi-party legislatures, sharing
government responsibility through coalitions and collegial executives, and
proportional electoral systems have a greater capacity to represent diffuse
groups and are less pressured by special interest groups. Second, consensus
democracies have a greater capacity to implement policies, given the broad
representation of affected interests during the decision-making process – an
aspect that might outweigh greater needs to accommodate diversity during
the stage of decision-making (Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998). Third, consensus
democracies have a greater capacity to develop policies over a longer period
of time, avoiding the problems of stop-and-go policy-making found in majori-
tarian systems (Crombez, 1996).
Lijphart’s findings suggest that consensus democracies are performing
‘at least as effectively in public policy-making’ (Lijphart, 1994: 8) as majori-
tarian ones. These results are backed by other scholars who assert that feder-
alist structures improve governments’ ability to provide security and pass
effective legislation (Elazar, 1987; Ostrom, 1991; Crombez, 1996). Hellman
(1998: 231) shows for post-communist countries that governments with many
veto players have been more successful in adopting and implementing
economic reforms. He argues that a more inclusive political system is better
able to produce comprehensive reform and is less prone to partial reforms
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serving particularistic interests. We should therefore also expect consensus
democracies to perform better than majoritarian systems with regard to the
formal and practical implementation of EU policies. On the basis of the argu-
ments advanced by Lijphart, we can derive the following hypothesis:
H1: The more a candidate country reveals characteristics of a consensus democ-
racy, the better it will be able to align its policies towards EU policies.
The veto-player approach as developed by Tsebelis (1995, 2002), however,
questions this expectation. Instead of distinguishing between different forms
of democracy – comparing presidential with parliamentary systems or
unicameral with bicameral legislations – Tsebelis looks directly at the number
and constellation of actors that are involved in decision-making processes.
Veto players, i.e. those actors ‘who can block the adoption of a policy’, are
crucial (Tsebelis, 1995: 305). Tsebelis hypothesizes that policy change becomes
more difficult, ceteris paribus, with a growing number of veto players; i.e. the
more players it takes to change the status quo.
Moving beyond the institutionalist approach applied by Lijphart, Tsebelis
also includes actors’ preferences in his model. Tsebelis (2002: 330–3) intro-
duces an ‘absorption rule’, according to which the number of veto players is
not relevant to policy stability if they have similar preferences. The policy
stability of the state then grows not only with the number of veto players in
the system but also with certain constellations of the veto players’ preferences.
First, the congruence of veto players’ preferences is of importance. The
more they differ in their policy positions, the less probable is policy change.
Tsebelis applies his concept of the size of win-sets to show that, with increas-
ing distance between the veto players, the number of outcomes that can
replace the status quo may be reduced. Secondly, the internal cohesion of collec-
tive veto players is relevant because it determines whether they can easily
agree on a common position. If one or more veto players are internally
divided, changing legislation may become harder in cases of low congruence
between veto players.
In empirical tests of his theory, Tsebelis (1995, 2002) finds support for the
suggested relationship between the numbers and preference distances of veto
players and the probability of policy change. The results of his regression
analyses with data for 18 advanced industrialized countries suggest that there
is a negative relation between the number and distance of veto players on the
one hand and the number of important laws passed on the other hand.
Tsebelis’ finding is thus consistent with the expectations put forward in his
work, which is theoretically backed – among other things – by literature on
divided government (e.g. Fiorina, 1992) and earlier work on federalism (Riker,
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1964). Recent studies on the implementation of EU legislation also underline
the argument (see, for instance, Haverland, 2000; Giuliani, 2003).
H2: The fewer the political constraints – from both constitutional and partisan
actors – prevailing in a candidate country, the better it will be able to align its
policies towards EU policies.
In sum, we are thus confronted with partially contradictory expectations
regarding the implementation effectiveness of EU law in the countries under
study. Whereas the theory of consensus democracy emphasizes the advantages
of the dispersion of political powers, and hence of more rather than fewer veto
points, the theory of veto players points in exactly the opposite direction. It is
important to emphasize in this context, however, that, by taking the perform-
ance of political systems as the dependent variable, Lijphart’s approach consti-
tutes a more encompassing perspective on implementation effectiveness,
including not only the capacity to enact political reforms but also the poten-
tial for the effective application of these decisions. Tsebelis, by contrast, is
concerned only with the decision-making capacity of political systems, without
examining more closely the effects of these decisions on actual performance.
Bureaucratic capacities and constraints
Theoretical approaches to account for varying degrees of implementation
effectiveness of EU policies in the member states are not restricted to the
analysis of the institutions and actor constellations of national political
systems. Rather, there are numerous studies that emphasize the need to inves-
tigate the resources and characteristics of the national bureaucracies. This is
particularly true when it comes to the analysis of the practical application of
EU law; i.e. the extent to which national administrative practices and struc-
tures are adjusted to EU requirements. In the literature, emphasis is especi-
ally placed on three characteristics of national administrations, namely, their
financial resources, their strength, and the degree of fit of existing adminis-
trative arrangements with European requirements.
With regard to the first aspect, financial capacities, conventional wisdom
has it that ‘money makes the world go round’. But does it also spin the wheel
of policy-making? Answering in the affirmative, Chayes and Chayes (1993:
178) assume that ‘governmental resources for policy analysis and decision
making are costly and in short supply’ (see also Haas et al., 1994). This
‘management approach’ assumes that failure to implement international
treaties can rarely be attributed to a deliberate decision but is more often the
result of problems of state capacity, namely, governmental or general resource
scarcity. Falkner et al. (2004: 461) put it clearly: ‘Sufficient financial or
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personnel resources are crucial for efficient implementation.’ Their study of
the implementation of six directives in 15 member states reveals that – besides
political opposition and issue-linkage – administrative shortcomings were the
‘prime source of transposition failure’ (2004: 466) in 7 infringement cases out
of 29. Pridham (1994: 99) acknowledges the same problem for the implemen-
tation of EU legislation in saying that the relatively poor ‘southern countries
do have particular problems of administrative procedure and competence’.
In more detailed studies of EU environmental policy, both Krämer (1996: 31)
and Demmke (2001) identify insufficient financing as the main cause of
member states’ implementation problems in this field.
The underlying causal mechanism of these assertions is relatively
straightforward: greater financial resources allow for a more prompt, compre-
hensive and sophisticated implementation of policies because civil servants,
their training, their computers, their offices and their cars, cost money.
Moreover, resources can buy the infrastructure that enables the steady flow
of information that is essential for the accountability of lower levels of hier-
archies (Phedon, 2003) and for the monitoring of the effects of policies. In
addition, administrations that are in charge of greater resources also possess
a greater capacity to provide citizens with positive incentives in order to
increase their compliance with regulatory requirements.
H3: The more financial resources are available to a candidate country’s govern-
ment, the better it will be able to align its policies towards EU policies.
The administrative capabilities to implement European legislation are
affected not only by the financial resources of the bureaucracy but also by the
effectiveness and quality of organizational structures and practices. This
general strength of the bureaucracy is determined by several aspects. First, it
depends on the extent to which national bureaucracies can perform their func-
tions with a certain degree of autonomy from political pressure. Especially in
transformation countries, which have been characterized by rapid changes in
government, a certain degree of bureaucratic stability and independence from
political developments has to be seen as an important precondition to ensure
continuity when adjusting domestic arrangements to EU requirements. By
contrast, in countries that lack the cushioning effect of an autonomous and
well-developed bureaucracy, there is a higher probability that a change in
government will yield negative effects with regard to the performance of
policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions. Second, bureau-
cratic strength increases with the extent to which administrative activities are
based on clearly specified legal rules. Third, accountability is generally seen
as a crucial factor that increases the quality and effectiveness of administrative
authorities (see Evans and Rauch, 1999; Knill, 2001: 61–85; Peters, 2001).
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H4: The greater the strength of its bureaucracies in terms of bureaucratic
autonomy, accountability and legal specification of administrative behaviour and
procedures, the better a country will be able to align its policies towards EU
policies.
Implementation problems, however, can be traced not only to a lack of
bureaucratic strength or sufficient resources. They might also be the result of
a lack of compatibility of domestic administrative styles and structures with the
requirements emerging from European legislation (see Duina, 1997; Knill and
Lenschow, 1998; Knill, 2001; Börzel, 2001; Bursens, 2002). In this context, it is
argued that effective implementation can be expected only as long as
European requirements do not challenge well-established administrative
styles and structures at the national level. Thus, a positive relationship
between the institutional fit of national administrations and their perform-
ance in implementing EU legislation is hypothesized.
However, in contrast to existing member states, the candidate countries
were undergoing a far-reaching process of political, administrative and
economic transformation while trying to bring domestic arrangements in line
with European requirements. As a result of this development, we consider
theories emphasizing institutional fit as a crucial predictor of implementation
performance to be of limited relevance. We can hardly expect administrative
traditions in the sense of well-established administrative styles and structures
to be of explanatory relevance because these traditions themselves are subject
to fundamental changes in the context of the transformation process. We will
therefore not consider theories based on these arguments in closer detail.
Empirical test
On the basis of the theoretical discussion, we have derived several factors
that might account for the variation in the implementation of the acquis in the
candidate countries, including the number of veto players, the resources of
the bureaucracy and bureaucratic autonomy. In the following, the hypothe-
ses based on our theoretical assessment will be tested empirically.
Variables and operationalization
Following the central research question addressed in this paper, the perform-
ance of the candidate countries in aligning their policies towards EU require-
ments is conceived as the dependent variable. This variable is not easily
quantified and measured. However, the task is facilitated by the fact that the
European Commission has been closely monitoring the process of alignment
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in the candidate countries on a yearly basis from 1998 to 2004, and continues
to monitor the countries that have not yet become members of the Union.2
These reports were introduced to provide a measure for exactly what we have
conceptualized as policy alignment. They encompass candidate countries’
progress with regard to not only the formal transposition of EU policies but
also the aspect of practical application.
We use these documents to construct an indicator that quantifies the
countries’ performances in the years 1999 to 2003. For reasons of missing data,
we exclude the year 1998. We also leave out the year 2004 because in this year
most of the countries under study lost their status as accession countries and
became EU member states.
Obviously, this indicator would not be a valid measurement of the above
concept if the European Commission were biased – by political or other
reasons – towards under- or overestimating the performance of certain of the
candidate countries. In particular, it might be argued that the different starting
positions of the countries (e.g. in terms of their economic performance or the
development of human rights or environmental standards) have a decisive
influence on the dependent variable, implying that countries starting from a
more advanced position are generally evaluated better than countries reveal-
ing a much bigger gap between the domestic status quo and EU requirements.
However, this argument of a systematic influence on the dependent variable
by the distance of a country from the desired status does not hold because
the Commission reports focus on relative changes – i.e. the progress of a
country – rather than on absolute gaps. ‘The accession conditions apply to all
the candidates, regardless of how far they are from membership. Both front-
runners and those further from accession need to show that they are making
progress’ (Grabbe, 2001: 1016). We thus assume that the Commission reports
constitute a sound indicator to measure progress in pre-accession alignment
in the candidate countries.
Using content analysis, we apply a word-in-context3 method that
measures the frequency, direction and intensity of criticism or approval of the
candidate countries’ performances. The Commission’s reports appear to be
appropriate for this kind of analysis because they use strongly formalized
language. Even though the reports are prepared by different country teams,
their structure and wording are very similiar.
We consider only word groups that clearly relate to the application of EU
policies, i.e. that appear close to or are mentioned in a clear context with
words such as acquis, Accession Partnership Priorities or certain policy fields’
denotations such as ‘in the environmental sector’. Furthermore, we consider
only words that appear in a context that assesses the progress of a candidate
country over one year and not statements that concern the overall level of
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alignment independent of actions taken or not taken during the year under
consideration.
For these word groups we first define the direction of the statement,
which can point to either criticism or approval. Then the intensity of the state-
ment is determined: we differentiate between strong, medium and weak.
Statements that include adverbs such as very, strongly, significantly, urgently
or adjectives such as substantial, serious, major, important are considered to be
strong. Weak statements include words such as some, partially, limited, as well
as notions of incompleteness and recommendations that are formulated in
the subjunctive form. All remaining word groups are categorized as implying
medium intensity. Next, every word group of weak criticism is evaluated with
one minus point, medium criticism with two minus points and strong disap-
proval with three minus points. The same logic applies to word groups that
express approval, such as the statement ‘in the field of food safety, substan-
tial progress has been made’. In a comprehensive coding scheme, we deter-
mined all the specific words to be counted in the content analysis. Finally, the
total points for each country and each year were summed to give an overall
and comparable assessment of their alignment performance during the
particular year. This indicator might be subject to the many shortcomings
associated with the rather indirect measuring that content analysis provides.
It has, however, the benefit of being an easily replicable and reliable measure-
ment of the concept of policy alignment. (An inter-coder reliability test with
a different coding person yielded a value of 0.78 for Lin’s concordance.)
Running a logistic regression of the candidate countries’ performances as
measured by this indicator on their chance of accession, we find that with
one word group of weak criticism above average a country’s probability of
joining the Union in 2004 sank by 0.08 approximately, at a significance level
of 0.1%. This means that a country that obtained more than the average criti-
cism in the Commission reports of 1999–2003 was less likely to become a EU
member state in 2004. Thus, disregarding political biases inside the
Commission, the indicator seems to be at least associated with the Copen-
hagen criteria of alignment towards EU policies.
Based on our theoretical considerations above, we consider the follow-
ing independent variables in order to account for variation in the alignment
performance of the candidate countries: political capacities and constraints,
governmental financial capabilities, and the general strength of the
bureaucracy.
For the measurement of the concept of political capacities and constraints
resulting from institutional and partisan veto players we rely on data collected
by Witold Henisz (2002).4 Henisz’s Polcon III index is a measure that esti-
mates the feasibility of policy change in a country in a given year. Henisz has
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successfully used this indicator as an explanatory variable for infrastructure
investment.
To construct the index, Henisz first identified the number of independent
branches of government that possess institutional veto power over policy
change in a country. Assuming a uniform and one-dimensional policy space,
he then incorporated the distance between the preferences of these actors into
his index. To do this, he used data on party alignment and the party compo-
sition of the executive and legislative branches. Furthermore, the degree of
preference heterogeneity within each of the collective actors was included.
The Polcon III index is thus constructed according to Tsebelis’ concept of 
veto players outlined above and should provide a valid measure of insti-
tutional and partisan constraints on overall policy change in the candidate
countries.
At the same time, we use the Polcon III index as an indicator for identi-
fying the extent to which the countries under investigation reflect a more
consensual or majoritarian democratic system. We are aware of the fact that
this procedure might be criticized because the items covered in the index are
not fully congruent with the analytical categories suggested by Lijphart. On
the other hand, there is a broad overlap between the categories used by
Henisz and Lijphart, the basic difference being that Polcon III contains infor-
mation on the preferences of political actors, an aspect that is not considered
relevant in Lijphart’s theory. Moreover, alternative sources and indicators that
explicitly concentrate on the measurement of consensus versus majoritarian
democracies for our countries under study are not yet available. By employ-
ing Henisz’s indicator of political constraints we include the impact of insti-
tutional and partisan veto players in the empirical test. To be sure, the
preferences of these actors are considered only under the assumption of a
uniform and one-dimensional policy space.
It is important to emphasize, however, that preferences towards the EU
might or might not be correlated with veto players’ left–right preferences that
Henisz considers in his approach. We thus control for actors’ policy positions
towards the EU. Yet, such data are not readily available for all the relevant
actors that Henisz introduces in his measure. Still, we can come up with a
measure for the preference of the single most important actor in the game:
the government. We take data from the data set on party policy in modern
democracies (Benoit and Laver, 2006) to construct an indicator that measures
the government’s political position towards EU membership.
The data set, building on expert surveys, provides a measure ranging
from 1 to 20 for the various political parties in the countries considered. A
party obtaining a value of 1 is strictly opposed to the country’s membership
in the EU, and a party attaining a value of 20 is totally in favour of accession
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to the EU. We merge the values of the different parties in government by
weighting them with their strength in the coalition. Strength is defined as a
party’s percentage of the government’s combined share of votes in the last
parliamentary election. It seems reasonable to assume that governmental
parties with fewer parliamentary seats also have less influence on the govern-
ment’s position concerning EU membership. If this control variable shows a
strong positive influence on the alignment performance of a candidate
country, then political willingness is crucial for alignment, and institutional
factors may have lesser influence.
The quantification of governments’ and bureaucracies’ financial capabil-
ities should not pose a problem: hard currency will do the job. We include
data on yearly government expenditures5 in US dollars as a proxy for finan-
cial administrative capacities. We also incorporate PPP-corrected data on
gross domestic product per capita in Euros6 as a control variable.
To measure the strength of the bureaucracy, we rely on an indicator of
overall bureaucratic quality, as measured by the World Bank’s index in
Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004 (Kaufmann et al.,
2005). The indicator combines analysts’ ratings of the quality of the bureauc-
racy, including the independence of the civil service from political pressure,
political stability, bureaucratic accountability and transparency as well as the
extent to which administrative activities are based on legal rules and proceed-
ings in the candidate countries. This measure thus provides us with a proxy
for the overall strength of the bureaucracy and, together with our measure
for the financial resources of the executive and veto players, allows us to
compare the influences of structures at the implementation level and of struc-
tures at the decision-making level on the success of alignment with the acquis.
Empirical findings
Our data reveal a large amount of variation between the candidate countries’
implementation performance. Figure 1 depicts the mean performance of the
various countries between 1999 and 2003.
The units of analysis for the empirical analysis are 65 country years, i.e.
the 13 candidate countries in the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.7 In
order to test whether the independent variables outlined above can account
for some portion of the variation shown above, an ordinary least squares
regression is performed. The regression model is fitted to the cross-sectional
time-series nature of the data and allows for an estimation in the presence of
temporal autocorrelation within panels. It is specified that there is temporal
autocorrelation8 with regard to the errors for countries and that the coefficient
of the process is specific to each country. The linear OLS regression of the five
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independent variables as operationalized above on the dependent variable –
performance in alignment towards EU policies – yields the results shown in
Table 1.
First, the political constraints index seems to be relevant. It shows a distinct
and statistically significant (at the 95% level) positive correlation between
candidate countries’ political constraints and their performance in imple-
menting EU policies. This finding supports hypothesis 1 and contradicts
hypothesis 2. This lends support to promoters of systems of checks and
balances and is in sharp contrast to Tsebelis’s (2002) theory of the impact of
veto players. It seems that, for the countries considered, a higher number of
veto players is associated with relatively good alignment performance.
Secondly, the positive correlation between the GDP per capita control
variable and alignment performance supports the idea that a candidate
country’s performance in aligning towards EU policies is dependent on its
economic capabilities. It could be that transformation towards the EU regu-
latory style, characterized by strong economies that can cope with policies of
market liberalization, is undertaken more easily in a country characterized
by a strong economy. It might thus be mainly EU policies on industry, service
and agriculture liberalization that are troublesome for poorer candidate
countries. However, the positive correlation of GDP per capita with alignment
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Figure 1 Mean alignment performance, 1999–2003.
performance could also reflect certain attitudes inside the Commission. The
reports on alignment from which the data were obtained could be biased
against poorer countries if there was a fear of endangering the economic
stability of the Union by accepting economically weak countries as members.
In order to fully research the causality behind the detected correlation, a more
comprehensive analysis disentangling different policy fields is needed.
Yet, the GDP per capita variable is statistically significant only at the 90%
level. Moreover, referring to governments’ financial capabilities, the more
direct measurement of government spending per capita does not show any statis-
tically significant correlation with the dependent variable. The idea stated in
hypothesis 3 that a candidate country’s performance in aligning towards EU
policies is dependent on its government’s financial capabilities is thus contra-
dicted by the data. These rather ambiguous findings suggest that it might be
relatively rich countries with relatively slim, well-functioning administrations
that have the least problems in aligning towards EU policies. This is
supported by the positive correlation between the quality of the bureaucracy
and the candidates’ alignment performance, which is statistically significant
at least at the 99% level. Thus, the data do not contradict hypothesis 4.
Countries with independently and effectively operating bureaucracies have
fewer problems in aligning to EU policies.
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Table 1 Results of the regressions
Candidates' performance in implementing Model 1 Model 2
EU policy (candidatesperformance) (n = 65) (n = 65)
Political constraints index (polconIII) 78.21** 76.85**
(28.04) (28.30)
Financial capabilities (government expenditures in 0.06 –0.03
US$ million per capita) (financialcap) (2.30) (2.40)
Gross domestic product in thousand €, PPP, 1.75* 1.82
per capita (GDPpc) (1.03) (1.24)
Bureaucratic strength (bureaustrength) 25.86*** 25.63***
(5.15) (5.48)
Government’s position (govposition) 0.99 0.97
(0.63) (0.63)
Level of democracy (polityIV) – –0.11
(1.64)
Wald-chi-squared 173.16 169.97
Prob > chi-squared 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
These findings are valid independently of the political willingness of the
government to implement EU regulations; i.e. its stance towards accession.
The variable government’s position, controlling for its eagerness to align to the
EU, shows no statistically significant correlation with the performance of
governments during pre-accession – even though the coefficient has the
expected positive sign. Government parties’ anti-European preferences seem
not to be clearly related to the performance of candidate countries in aligning
to the acquis.
In a second model, we have also controlled for the level of democracy in
the acceding countries with data from the PolityIV project (Gurr and Jaggers,
2003). It has been argued that leaders of more democratic countries had a
greater incentive to push ahead with alignment with EU rules and institutions
because of pressure from the electorate (Mattli and Plümper, 2004: 313). Yet
the variable does not show a statistically significant positive impact on our
measure of candidates’ performance. We have to acknowledge, however, that
there is not much variation in levels of democracy in our small sample of EU
candidate countries, which have all achieved a high level of democracy. The
inclusion of the variable does not reduce the significance of the political
constraints index and the quality of bureaucracy measure, which seem to be
robustly associated with the candidates’ alignment performance.
Conclusion
This article aimed to find explanations for differences in candidate countries’
performance records of implementing EU policies prior to accession. Several
theories on the preconditions for policy change and on implementation
problems were surveyed and reconsidered in their applicability to pre-
accession alignment. Subsequently, four hypotheses on the impact of politi-
cal constraints and financial and administrative capabilities on pre-accession
alignment were fashioned.
Empirical testing of our hypotheses suggests several interesting findings.
First, and probably most surprising, veto-player theory has found no support
in our data on candidate countries’ performance in adopting the acquis
communautaire of the EU. On the contrary, the data support the idea that
consensus decision-making increases the prospects of quick and comprehen-
sive implementation of the acquis. Obviously, a higher number of veto players
favoured not only effective decision-making in order to comply formally with
EU requirements but also the domestic capacities to apply the relevant
decisions in practice. Second, the quality and effectiveness of their bureauc-
racy is of great importance for candidate countries in aligning national
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policies towards the EU. This finding suggests that the characteristics of the
bureaucracy are at least as important as the nature of their political systems
for the performance of countries. In contrast, the political position of govern-
ments towards accession, i.e. their willingness to align policies, seems to be
less important once accession negotiations have started and clear condition-
ality for membership is in place.
How can these partially surprising results be explained? First, the rejec-
tion of the veto-player hypothesis might be traced to the fact that – in contrast
to other studies on the implementation of EU policies supporting this
argument (see Haverland, 2000; Giuliani, 2003) – the focus of this study was
not just on formal but also on practical implementation. Practical application
is basically a matter of bureaucracy rather than the realm of politics, implying
that veto players are of less importance during this stage of the implementa-
tion process. Looking at both formal and practical implementation, our
findings hence indicate that implementation effectiveness seems to be more
affected by problems of practical application than by formal transposition of
European requirements.
Second, our findings support the arguments by Grabbe (2001: 1029) that
EU conditionality in the candidate countries generally implied a strengthen-
ing of the core executive at the expense of parliaments and other branches of
government. As a result, the influence of veto players with regard to pre-
accession might be lower than expected from the outset.
Third, it might be the case that countries that took the decision to join
the Union – and thus to fulfil the preconditions for joining – with the consent
of a greater number of veto players might find it easier to adopt and imple-
ment the acquis because the different national actors will support this process.
We can assume that there is a clear preference in such consensus democra-
cies towards accession among not only the majority but a broad political coali-
tion. It then seems reasonable that governments that are even more
anti-European would not dare to decelerate the pace of accession. In contrast,
for countries where governments decided to apply for EU membership and
faced no veto-playing constraints in taking that decision, there is some prob-
ability that EU-sceptical minority groups might try to hinder the quick and
comprehensive alignment of policies. Moreover, even minor changes in the
median voter’s preferences in these countries could result in a decisive
majority opposing the accession process.
Even if we assume relatively stable preferences because of the high costs
linked to breaking out of accession agreements once the process of aligning
has started, obstruction is possible in the implementation phase of policy-
making. Impeding alignment might be not only dependent on institutional
veto power but also possible in the stage of policy implementation. Here, the
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strength of the bureaucracy is of utmost importance. Where bureaucratic
strength is high and bureaucratic action is less dependent on possibly
unstable political input, the process of alignment towards the EU, once
started, can go ahead smoothly.
In conclusion, our results suggest that the functioning and the quality of
the domestic bureaucracy constitute crucial preconditions for effective align-
ment with EU policy requirements. This holds true in particular if the focus
is not only on the formal transposition but also on the practical application
of EU requirements. This finding is of interest for further pre-accession strat-
egies. Support for the setting up and improvement of administrations has,
according to the data used, a greater effect than the funding of governments.
Appeals to achieve political consensus on increasing efforts towards align-
ment seem to be of less relevance for the success of enlargement than efforts
to strengthen administrative structures. Moreover, our results indicate that
the peculiarities of national bureaucracies might play a central role in shaping
processes of Europeanization and implementation of EU policies in general.
Notes
1 For the purpose of this article, we refer to all of the following countries as
EU candidate countries in the period 1998–2004, notwithstanding changes in
the official status of their application: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Turkey.
2 The Commission’s regular reports on progress towards accession are access-
ible at URL (accessed 25 April 2006): http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge-
ment/report_11_98/index.htm#report. The conclusions of the regular
reports, which are executive summaries with already reduced data, are used.
3 See Weber (1990) for the advantages and shortcomings of this approach.
4 The data were accessed at URL (consulted January 2006): http://www.
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/.
5 We take these numbers from the CIA World Factbook series, accessible 
at URL (consulted January 2006): http://www.theodora.com/wfb/
abc_world_fact_book.html
6 These data are provided in the appendices to the Commission’s regular
reports, accessible at URL (consulted January 2006): http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargement/report_11_98/index.htm#report.
7 A negative binomial regression could also be performed because data on
reforms and the passing of legislation could also be considered to be count
data. However, we prefer to include the intensity dimension in our indicator
since success and failure vary greatly in the Commission report. Therefore,
we use the index of implementation progress discussed above and take
country years as units of analysis. We thus assume that our data are ordered
on an interval scale, which is of course disputable.
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8 In a Woolridge test, the hypothesis that there is no serial correlation could
not be refuted, with an F-statistic significant at the 0.5 level only.
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